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Deleuze and Epicurean Philosophy 
Atomic Speed and Swerve Speed  
Michael James Bennett 
McMaster University 
Although Gilles Deleuze’s appropriation of ancient Stoic ontology has 
been much scrutinized, both by Deleuzians and by Hellenists,1 his reading 
of Epicureanism has not received as much attention.2 This is a shame, since 
Deleuze’s explicit reading of Epicurus in texts like “Lucretius and the 
Simulacrum” (1961) and Difference and Repetition (1968) sheds light on his 
conception of problematic ideas in a way that has not yet been fully 
perceived. Moreover, understanding Deleuze’s reading of Epicurus clarifies 
the etiology of some of the more perplexing figures of his philosophy. In 
What is Philosophy? (1991), when Deleuze and Guattari formalize an image of 
thought, a meta-philosophical conception of what philosophy is or what it 
should be, they argue that philosophy strives to emulate the infinite speed of 
what they call “chaos” by means of creating concepts and installing a plane 
of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari’s otherwise puzzling discussion of 
speed in What is Philosophy?, and particularly the “infinite speed” to which 
they assign such importance, should be understood as derived, at least in 
part, from a reading of Epicurus. It is also for the most part consistent with 
Deleuze’s reading of Epicurean physics in ‘Lucretius and the Simulacrum’, 
with one or two exceptions. This paper explicates three of Deleuze’s 
readings of Epicurus over the course of his career: first in Difference and 
Repetition, then in “Lucretius and the Simulacrum”, and finally in What is 
Philosophy? Perceiving the continuities and discontinuities among these 
readings makes it possible to see that an appropriation of Epicurean physics 
is more central to Deleuze’s philosophy than is often appreciated.    
The Epicurean Speed of Atoms  
Deleuze recognizes Epicurean atomism as an attempt to formalize a 
conception of problematic ideas, a precursor to his own attempt to do so in 
Difference and Repetition, because Epicurus explicitly conceived of ideas as 
multiplicities – in this case, “multiplicities of atoms, atoms being the 
objective elements of thought.”3 Epicurus, that is, identifies thoughts or 
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ideas with compounds of atoms. Deleuze’s reference to “sensible 
compounds”4 indicates that he is relying on Epicurus’ theory of eidôla 
(“images”, simulacra in Lucretius). And so Deleuze’s interpretive claim 
cannot be fully understood without an analysis of Epicurean eidôla that 
Deleuze assumes but does not provide. 
 Epicurus contends that there is a kind of continuity between 
perception and conception. Having established that atoms are the principles 
of all things, Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus5 describes the ceaseless character 
of atomic movement. Atoms are always moving.6 Furthermore, they must all 
move at the same, constant speed, since the condition of atomic movement 
(the void) can’t vary the speed of atoms by offering any differential 
resistance whatsoever.7 Epicurus also claims that any attempt to describe the 
edges or boundaries of compounds, far from being able to fall back on 
mathematical limit-entities, must account for the “outlines” of compounds, 
which are not zero-dimensional but atomic, just “much finer than the objects 
of which they are the outlines.”8 The constituent atoms of these outlines, like 
all atoms, must be constantly moving and must therefore have a certain 
speed. Epicurus describes the outlines as tupoi (“types”, sometimes 
translatable as “stamps” or “impressions”) having the same skhêma (shape or 
form) as the original compounds. A couple of lines later, Epicurus calls such 
homoschematic types “eidôla.”9 The conventional way of conceiving of eidôla 
is as films of very fine atoms that maintain for a relatively long time the 
schematic outline of whatever compound they were the edge of. Epicurus 
appears to be thinking thus: while in bodily compounds atoms bang into 
one another and are prevented from attaining the greatest speed they are 
capable of, at the edges of bodies the jumble of resisting atoms suddenly 
gives way and the component atoms of the eidôla attain their maximal 
natural speed; “since their movement through the void occurs with no 
conflict from [atoms which] could resist them, it can cover any 
comprehensively graspable distance in an inconceivably [short] time.”10 
Thus the persevering flow (rheusis sunekhês) of eidôla-films moves extremely 
quickly, as Epicurus puts it “as fast as thought [hama noêmati].”11  
Deleuze picks up on this description of the movement of eidôla (“as fast 
as thought”) to support his contention that Epicurean ideas are 
“multiplicities of atoms.”12 Now, Deleuze would be citing opportunistically 
if Epicurus were simply comparing the speed of eidôla to something that also 
seems (at least sometimes) to occur astonishingly quickly: thinking.13 But 
this is no incidental comparison: the identification of eidôla with thoughts or 
“ideas” (Deleuzian terminology alien to Epicurus) is an essential part of 
Epicurean epistemology. Epicurus claims that both perceiving and thinking 
occur through of the action of eidôla upon percipient beings: “it is when 
something from the external objects [i.e. an image] enters into us that we see 
and think about their shapes.”14 There is a continuity between perception and 
conception in Epicurus to the extent that both are derived from the action of 
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eidôla. 
The notion that conception and perception are both effects of eidôla was, 
however, a widely derided Epicurean doctrine. Often condensed into the 
lapidary formula “all perceptions are true”, the Epicurean proposition 
induces Cicero, for example, to call Epicurus a “gullible man.”15 
Nevertheless, the doctrine that all perceptions are true is crucial for 
Epicurus, since without the truth of perceptions he thinks there can be no 
productive reasoning, just an unintelligible morass of opinions and 
perceptual judgments.16 Stephen Everson’s sympathetic reading of the 
doctrine emphasizes its dependence on the distinctive qualities of eidôla.17 
“All perceptions are true” means that perceptions just are (or are reducible 
to) the action of eidôla on our senses. Perceived in the proper way, and 
prolonged into thoughts or ideas, all eidôla are “true”, even when (as 
sometimes happens) an eidôlon’s homoschematic relationship to its original 
is distorted.18 In fact, the occasional distortion of eidôla explains why we 
sometimes think and dream about non-existent creatures like Centaurs.19 
Sextus Empiricus, paraphrasing an Epicurean, confirms this interpretation: 
I would not say that the vision is deceived just because 
from a great distance it sees the tower as small and round 
but from near to it as larger and square. Rather I would 
say it is telling the truth. Because when the sense-object 
appears to it small and of that shape it really is small and 
of that shape, the edges of the eidôla getting eroded as a 
result of their travel through the air.20 
The Epicurean truth of a perception or conception is reducible to its being 
the action of eidôla of a certain kind. Eidôla may no longer entirely do justice 
to their original, but there is no deception in their manner of acting upon us. 
Epicurus is reported to have claimed not just that each sense has its own 
proper object, a certain kind of atom, say, but also that different senses 
cannot refute one another “because they are not discriminatory of the same 
things.”21 Auditory hallucinations, for instance, are not caused by pungent 
atoms, and so on. Epicurus wants to explain why it is that different senses 
do not refute or even conflict with one another by accounting for sensation 
as the action of eidôla. This sort of a basis for the truth of perceptions, 
Everson points out, is only a “disappointing result” from the point of view 
of “post-Pyrrhonian” expectations about the nature of truth.22 “Post-
Pyrrhonian” here refers to a Hellenistic intellectual climate influenced by 
ancient skepticism, and characterized by the deeply un-Epicurean 
assumption that senses can and do conflict. Such conflict was taken as a 
given by almost all subsequent Hellenistic epistemologies, leading them to 
speak about perception in quite a different way – in terms of how, in light of 
perceptual conflict, we can say anything true (that is, perception-
independent) about objects perceived. 
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 When Deleuze says that ideas are problematic in Epicurus, he is 
tapping into this rich vein. Epicurus’ association of perception and eidôla is 
not only provocative in the ancient context, but also widely misunderstood. 
Eidôla-ideas are problematic, for Epicurus, in part because they ground 
claims about what actually exists (the post-Pyrrhonian discourse on truth) 
without the specifically Epicurean truth they convey being identifiable with 
such claims. Herein lies the significance of the Epicurean distinction between 
perception-conception and opinion. While perceptions and ideas are always 
“true” or epistemologically primary, claims about what’s really out there, the 
sources of the potentially distorted images, can be false. In fact, only such 
claims can be false: “Falsehood [pseudos] or going-astray [diêmartêmenon] 
always comes from an added opinion [en tô prosdoxazomenô].”23 For 
Epicurus, “added opinions” have a strictly negative sense. At best, they 
report while adding nothing to perception, and at worst they introduce 
falsehood into the perceptual-ideational loop. But in a remarkable reversal of 
philosophical discourse, what Epicurus calls “truth” itself comes to have a 
negative sense already by the time of Cicero, and for the subsequent 
Hellenistic tradition generally, which refuses to connects the truth-
conditions of propositions to the activity of mysterious eidôla. The doctrine 
of eidôla tells the subsequent Hellenistic epistemological tradition nothing 
about the sort of truth it comes to be interested in. The doctrine just looks 
like a physical postulate.24 Everson reminds us that the sort of 
epistemological claims which Epicurus relegated to opinion (claims about 
enduring objects in an intersubjective world) eventually became the primary 
interest of mainstream epistemology. What Epicurus called the objects of 
opinion become the definienda of a new “post-Pyrrhonian” conception of 
truth. In other words, after Epicurus (perhaps as a consequence of the 
development of Stoic propositional logic), the primary bearer of truth-value 
becomes a doxa, what modern thought identifies as a belief, opinion, 
proposition, representation or judgment. For Epicurus, on the contrary, the 
eidôlon is the primary truth-value bearer, and such a thing cannot be false, 
although it is susceptible to incorrect beliefs or judgments by the hasty, 
usually non-Epicureans. 
 Given this historical reversal in the discourse on truth, the Epicurean 
characterization of ideas as multiplicities of atoms alone does not entirely 
explain Deleuze’s appropriation of Epicurean physics. Since at this point 
Deleuze links the characterization of ideas as multiplicities to the Epicurean 
doctrine of eidôla (without of course deriving the former from the latter),25 
and this doctrine already has a negative status in the epistemological 
tradition (meaning not only that it tends to be scoffed at but that it tells us 
nothing about truth differently understood), to say that ideas are 
multiplicities of atoms cannot help but sound like a negative claim about the 
indeterminacy of ideas from the point of view of what Epicurus called 
opinion, but what Cicero thinks of as knowledge. Deleuze, in contrast, wants 
to offer an account of the determination, and in fact self-determination, of 
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problematic ideas, in contrast with Kant.26 And, he thinks, so does Epicurus. 
Since Epicurean and post-Pyrrhonian conceptions of the relation between 
truth and opinion are talking past one another, then understanding one 
conception (the Epicurean) from the point of view of the other (post-
Pyrrhonian) requires evaluating the former according to the extrinsic 
requirements of the latter. Happily, however, Deleuze discovers that the 
Epicurean theory is richer. Epicurus does not just recognize that 
multiplicities of atoms are eidôla, the Epicurean equivalents of problematic 
ideas, the supposed truth-value of which is hard to assess (or indeterminate) 
from the point of view of a post-Pyrrhonian framework. Epicurus also 
claims that his problematic ideas possess an immanent mechanism of self-
determination. Since Epicurean Ideas are multiplicities of atoms, their 
problematicity depends on the existence of a theory of the immanent self-
determination of atoms. Deleuze reads the Epicurean swerve as playing 
precisely this role:  
it is indeed essential that atoms be related to other atoms 
at the heart of structures that are actualized in sensible 
composites. In this regard, the clinamen [swerve] is by no 
means a change of direction in the movement of an atom, 
much less an indetermination testifying to the existence of a 
physical freedom. It is the original determination of the 
direction of movement, the synthesis of movement and its 
direction which relates one atom to another.27 
No text attributed to Epicurus referring to the atomic swerve survives, but 
reliable reports imply there was such a text.28 Although both Diogenes of 
Oinoanda and Cicero suggest that Epicurus introduced the swerve to avoid 
the necessitarian implications of Democritean atomism, Deleuze does not 
discuss the swerve in the context of a reconstruction of ancient Greek 
theories of fate.29 In fact, he thinks that the essential thing about the swerve 
is not the indeterminacy it introduces into the Epicurean universe, either as a 
discovery of free will30 or as the justification of the irreducibility of mental 
states to physical ones,31 but rather the intrinsic determination of a relation 
between atoms. Since ideas are multiplicities of such atoms, the intrinsic 
determination of atomic compounds should provide a theory of the 
immanent operation of problematic ideas – the “treasure” hidden in 
Epicurean atomism.32 
Lucretius offers basically two arguments for the swerve, one 
cosmological and one libertarian.33 Deleuze’s appropriation of the swerve 
depends on the first. Here it is: 
when these bodies [atoms] are being drawn downwards 
by their own weight straight through the void, at totally 
uncertain times and uncertain places [incerto tempore … 
incertisque locis] they turn aside a little in space, just so 
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much that you could call their motion changed. Because if 
they were not accustomed to swerve [nisi declinare 
solerent], everything would fall downwards through the 
deep void, like drops of rain, no collisions would occur 
and no blows be effected among the atoms: nature would 
not have created anything.34 
If this argument is taken, as it is sometimes, to show the necessity of a first 
creative swerve at the origin of the universe then it is actually at odds with 
what both Epicurus and Lucretius say elsewhere: that the universe is 
temporally infinite, has no beginning and that its motion is perpetual.35 A 
better way to understand the swerve then is not as an explanation of how 
collisions began, but of why there are generative collisions at all.36 Epicurus 
is probably responding, as he often is, to Aristotle’s criticisms of Democritus. 
Democritus said that all motion is “forced” or occurs through collisions 
among atoms and that the atoms themselves have no “natural motions.”37 
Consequently, Aristotle complains that Democritus provides no arkhê, or 
principle, for atomic collisions — not a temporal arkhê (literally, a beginning) 
but arkhê in the sense of a governing inner principle or “nature.”38 
Democritus has no answer to the question: why are atoms the sort of thing 
that collide? Epicurus responds to Aristotle by improving on Democritus in 
two ways. First, he attributes weight to atoms as a natural motion, that is, 
the tendency to move, if unimpeded by other atoms, at an extremely fast 
speed through the void (“as fast as thought”).39 Second, Epicurus attributes 
to atoms the swerve, the tendency to collide (Lucretius says the atoms 
declinare solerent, “have a tendency to swerve”) even though you’d think atoms 
moving along parallel trajectories would persist in parallel, laminar 
movement. 
 This reading of the swerve corroborates Deleuze’s claim that its 
purpose is to explain, or provide a figure for, the self-determination or 
“reciprocal determination” of atomic compounds: “the clinamen is the 
reciprocal determination which is produced in a ‘time smaller than the 
minimum continuous time thinkable’.”40 Deleuze makes a similar remark in 
“Lucretius and the Simulacrum”, where he calls self-determination 
“synthesis”:  
we must conceive of an originary direction for each atom, 
as a synthesis which would give to the movement of the 
atom its initial direction, without which there would be no 
collision. This synthesis is necessarily accomplished in a 
time smaller than the minimum of continuous time. This is 
the clinamen.41  
So far, Deleuze’s reading is quite conventional: the doctrine of clinamen is 
supposed to respond to Aristotle by explaining the relation of atoms with 
one another in terms of an internal tendency. But why does Deleuze 
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introduce these considerations about the speed at which the determination of 
a relation among atoms (the swerve) takes place? We must chase down 
Deleuze’s allusions.  
The phrase that appears in Difference and Repetition in inverted commas, 
“time smaller than the minimum of continuous time thinkable”, appears to 
be a quotation (although it is not), and in “Lucretius and the Simulacrum” 
Deleuze refers to the Letter to Herodotus, sections 61 and 62. Now, section 61 
is all about the movement of atoms in the void. Epicurus claims all atoms 
move at an equal speed through the void because the void offers no 
resistance. Furley calls this motion at “atomic speed”,42 and Epicurus says 
here that it occurs “as fast as thought.” Section 62, in contrast, is about the 
(so to speak) statistical or molar movement of atoms in compounds. 
Epicurus tries to reconcile the facts that some compounds move faster than 
others and that atoms in these compounds are all moving equally fast. 
Epicurus presents a tricky passage where he either relies on or defines two 
units of time, neither of which corresponds to Deleuze’s “minimum of 
continuous time thinkable.” Compounds manifestly move at different 
speeds, but atoms all move equally fast because: 
atoms in compounds are moving in one direction in a 
minimum of continuous time [kata ton elakhiston sunekhê 
kronon], and not in one [direction] in times distinguishable 
by reason [kata tous logo theôrêtous kronous], but they 
frequently collide until the continuity of their motion 
becomes perceptible.43  
Epicurus mentions a minimum of continuous time and what seems to be a 
minimum of thinkable time, but not a “minimum of continuous thinkable 
time.” Deleuze has conflated these two times in Epicurus, and their 
corresponding speeds. This conflation is by no means fatal to Deleuze’s 
argument about the swerve (which Epicurus is not talking about here 
anyway), but it does present a challenge to grasping his point.  
Epicurus’ second unit of time is easier to deal with: the speed of atoms 
in “times distinguishable by reason” appears to be equivalent to the “atomic 
speed” of atoms through the void, where they move as fast as thought; both 
descriptions refer to the speed of atoms themselves, not the speed of 
compounds. The other unit, the “minimum of continuous time”, seems like 
it should be equivalent to a minimal quantum of time, since Epicurus uses 
the same word (elakhiston) to denote this time and the minimum of 
magnitude.44 But that can’t be correct. It doesn’t make sense to say that a 
temporal minimum is defined by the slowed down movement of atoms in 
compounds, because it remains possible to conceive of a smaller time, or a 
quicker motion, namely, that of the unimpeded atom. The true minimum of 
time, the smallest conceivable, can only be formally defined as how long it 
takes an unimpeded atom to travel one spatial minimum. And indeed, so 
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great an authority as Furley denies that Epicurus could be referring to a true 
minimum when he says “minimum of continuous time.” Rather, Furley 
thinks, what Epicurus calls “times discernable by reason” refer to true 
minima of time: “the times which are distinguishable only in thought are 
indivisible units of time—periods of time, of course, not instants or limits—
within which an atom ‘has moved’ (for you can never say ‘it is moving’) 
over an indivisible unit of space.”45  
Furley’s reference to the Aristotelian distinction between “is moving” 
and “has moved”, between kinêsis (movement or change) and kinêmata 
(jumps, or literally “having moveds”), hints at how we should resolve 
Deleuze’s confusion.46 What Epicurus calls an “elakhiston of continuous 
time” is not the same as an “elakhiston of time” full stop. Epicurean time, like 
motion and magnitude, is fundamentally discontinuous. A minimum of 
continuous time must be, Furley says, a “multiple” of true minima, more 
like an atom of time than a true minimum (since a minimum implies 
discontinuity).47 If this is so, then what immediately follows the tricky 
passage in Epicurus makes sense: “For the added opinion about the 
imperceptible—that the time which can be distinguished by reason will 
allow for continuous movement—is not true of such things.”48 That is, it is 
erroneous to think that continuous time (or movement) can produce 
discontinuous time (or movement). In fact, the opposite is true: there seems 
to be continuity at the level of perceptible bodies, but the discontinuous 
movements and times accessible to reason refute such continuity. 
Sadly, Deleuze has transferred the word “continuous” into his 
discussions of Epicurean atomic motion where it does not belong. It is not 
the case for Epicurus, as Deleuze claims, that the “minimum of continuous 
time refers to the apprehension of thought.”49 But it would be fair to say that 
the true minimum of discontinuous time does refer to the apprehension of 
thought; that is, it can only be thought, and has to be thought, to explain the 
apparent continuity of molar movement. Luckily, Deleuze’s error is not fatal 
to his claims about the swerve or the existence of genuinely problematic 
ideas in Epicureanism, because it merely misses an Epicurean distinction 
that is not central to Deleuze’s argument: there are not two velocities of 
atoms in Epicureanism, as Deleuze thinks (the continuous speed of thought 
and the faster speed of the swerve); there are three (the continuous speed of 
opinion, the discontinuous speed of thought, and the even faster speed of 
the swerve). What Deleuze explicitly says—that the swerve, as a 
determination of the relation between atoms, is accomplished faster than a 
minimum of continuous time—is true but trivial, since for Epicurus the 
continuous time of opinion is slower than even the time of thought. But 
what Deleuze wants to say is far from trivial: that the determination of a 
relation among atoms is accomplished even faster than the smallest time 
determinable by reason—faster than the true minimum of time, not just 
faster than opinion but “faster than thought.” Deleuze thus means that the 
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swerve stands for a “third speed of the image” (as Melinda Cooper has aptly 
pointed out50), faster than both the image of opinion (continuity) and the 
eidôla of thought (discontinuity). 
Good and Bad Infinities 
“Lucretius and the Simulacrum” expands on the idea that the swerve 
accomplishes an intrinsic reciprocal determination of atoms in a time smaller 
than the temporal minimum, or an originary synthesis of atomic motion, by 
introducing the related claim that Epicurean atomism entails distinguishing 
the true from the false infinity: 
What is essential to physics is to be found in the theory of 
the infinite, and of the spatial and temporal minima … 
[and] this fundamental object of physics: to determine what 
is really infinite and what is not, and to distinguish the true 
from the false infinite.51 
According to Deleuze, the implicit Epicurean doctrine of infinities has 
everything to do with the theory of minima (or infinitesimals) and their 
relation to a prior determination that occurs through the swerve. Deleuze is 
aware of how the theory of indivisible minima is linked to an intuition that 
has been labeled “proto-calculus”, as he remarks, “It is not surprising that 
Epicurus makes use here of the vocabulary of exhaustion: there is something 
analogous in the clinamen to a relation between the differentials of atoms in 
movement.”52 I take the phrase “differentials of atoms” to be approximately 
equivalent to elakhista or minima. Thus Deleuze implies that the theory of 
swerve as the relation between minima provides answers to questions about 
how they are related. David Konstan has influentially argued that the 
majority of such questions (e.g. how do minima abut one another, if not by 
means of limit-entities?) are badly posed from the Epicurean point of view, 
since they imply that the relation takes place in terms of the actuality of a 
mathematical state of affairs.53 As we shall see, Deleuze claims in contrast 
that the relation of the differentials of atoms does not have the character of 
an actuality, but that the relation between minima in the swerve has the 
ontological status of a virtual event. 
But how does the Epicurean theory of infinitesimals relate to the 
distinction between true and false infinity? Deleuze’s attitude toward 
interpretations of calculus provides an instructive parallel. If Deleuze thinks 
that the relation dy/dx (differentiation) is an example of a “pure relation” 
that determines itself immanently, and that consequently the differential 
relation is prior to the primary function of which it is supposed to be 
“derivative”,54 then the primary function itself must be derived, or better 
generated, by an operation inverse to differentiation. This is integration, an 
operation typically understood as early as the seventeenth century as a 
“process of summation in the form of a series.”55 Now, the idea of summing 
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infinitesimals is unattractive for a number of reasons (for example, the 
summation of indeterminate entities like dx to generate a determinate 
function looks question-begging), and it was replaced in the “discretizing” 
programme of Weierstrass and others by the notion of summing limit-
entities.56 Nevertheless, as late as 1981 Deleuze expresses admiration for the 
idea of summing infinitesimals in order to generate functions from the 
differential relation. Deleuze considers this sense of integration to involve a 
novel formulation of infinity (novel in the sense of distinct from the 
inexhaustible infinity of classical geometry): integration shows that in the 
primitive function “something finite consists of an infinity under a certain 
relation.” Under the influence of this novel infinity, Deleuze says, the 
calculus attains an “equilibrium point, for seventeenth-century thought, 
between the finite and the infinite, by means of a new theory of relations.”57 
This new theory of relations is what Deleuze is looking to extract from 
different contexts and fields of inquiry. It is, for instance, the “treasure” 
hidden in the “barbaric” interpretations of the calculus and again in the 
Epicurean swerve. 
Deleuze sees a similarly novel “theory of relations” afoot in Epicurean 
atomism, along with an allied novel sense of infinity. While the differential 
aspect of the new theory of relations is embodied in the figure of the swerve, 
the integral aspect appears in a notion of the infinite sum analogous to the 
barbaric interpretation of integration. For Epicurus: 
Nature must be thought of as the principle of the diverse 
and its production … Nature as the production of the 
diverse can only be an infinite sum, that is, a sum that 
does not totalize its own elements. Nature is not collective 
… it expresses itself through ‘and’ and not through ‘is’. … 
things exist one by one, without any possibility of their 
being gathered together all at once.58 
Epicurus does not quite say what Deleuze attributes to him, but he comes 
close. Epicurus does identify the universe with an infinite number: “in terms 
of the number of atoms and the magnitude of the void, the universe [to pan] 
is infinite.”59 For Deleuze, the intrinsic self-determination of the problematic 
idea implies or requires this sense of an infinite sum that doesn’t entail unity 
or totality, just as the extrinsic determination of the problematic idea implies 
or requires the presupposition of a “systematic unity of Nature”, the World, 
which is even, in the case of Kant, conceived of as an infinite limit: “an 
infinite determination in relation to the concepts of the understanding.”60 
Infinity without totality, on the other hand, presupposes the swerve as a 
kind of positive indeterminacy–—a vagueness that isn’t a function of limited 
understanding—which Deleuze identifies with “the irreducible plurality of 
causes or causal series, and the impossibility of bringing causes together into 
a whole.”61 Infinity understood as a curative for holism is what Deleuze calls 
the “true infinity” advocated by Epicurus, and the swerve its embodiment. 
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Nature is truly infinite when the swerve stands for the unthinkability of 
“Nature as a whole.” 
 What then is Epicurus’ “false infinity”? Above all, Epicurus thinks we 
should not regard as infinite “every worldly or intra-worldly 
combination,”62 even the compound of atoms we call the cosmos: “one must 
believe that the cosmoi, and every finite compound which is similar in form 
to those which are frequently seen, have come into being from the infinite … 
and that all are dissolved again.”63 Embracing a position criticized by 
Aristotle in On Generation and Corruption, Epicurus holds that the only sense 
of creation and destruction can be that of finite modes, becoming finite in 
birth and becoming infinite in death, so to speak.64 For example, Epicurus 
says, the percipient soul is just a compound of atoms in the world, finite and 
thus subject to losing the unity and identity characteristic of finitude but not 
infinity, in other words subject to disaggregation.65 But Deleuze points out 
how for Epicurus illusions predicated on falsely attributing infinity to a 
merely intra-worldly combination produce suffering and psychic 
disturbance among humans.66 For instance, the illusion of the infinite 
duration of the soul and the possibility of an infinitely long punishment 
after death is of this kind.67 Epicurean physics has the moral purpose of 
divesting people of such mystifications by destroying the false infinity they 
presuppose.  
But how does Epicurus explain why people have a false sense of infinity 
in the first place? According to Deleuze’s innovative reading, the illusions of 
false infinity are consequences of the extreme speed at which eidôla are 
propagated. Like Kantian transcendental illusions, Epicurean false infinities 
are internal to perception-cognition itself. Eidôla impact the senses in a “time 
discernable to reason alone,” and thus at a speed faster than a “minimum 
continuous time.”68 Deleuze equates the latter with a “minimum of sensible 
time.” Since eidôla are not perceivable as such, one is only aware of 
perceiving permanent external objects. But the permanency of such objects 
is, for Epicurus, a function of opinion: we believe we see permanent objects or 
continuous motion, but we see eidôla. Because of the way perception, 
cognition and opinion divide their labor, Deleuze says, it is common for the 
illusions of false infinity to arise: “In virtue of their speed, which causes 
them to be and to act below the sensible minimum, simulacra produce the 
mirage of a false infinite in the images they form.”69 When one sees something 
(say, in a dream) that looks like a divine being or a terrifying human-animal 
hybrid, although it is a product of the motion of imperceptibly fast images 
and not a real, abiding object, opinion steps into its habitual role and 
ascribes existence and permanence to the simulacral object.70 
Deleuze’s contrast between true and false infinities, and the treatment of 
Epicurean nature as an infinite sum without totality, enhances his discussion 
of problematic ideas. Epicurean false infinity hinges on the fact that 
simulacra move “as fast as thought” and no faster. False Epicurean infinity 
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remains with minima, elakhista, infinitesimals (the Epicurean equivalents of 
the undetermined dx), without advancing to an understanding of the 
positive role of the clinamen (equivalent to the differential relation dy/dx), 
that describes the intrinsic determination of difference in itself. What 
Epicurus denounces as false infinity is the ancient Greek counterpart of what 
Deleuze rejects as “extrinsicism”,71 in which problematic ideas are 
understood from the point of view of something external to them – in the 
case of Kant, possible experience and what Deleuze calls “representation”; in 
the case of Epicurus, “added opinion.” 
But Deleuze’s distinction between true and false infinity is oddly 
Hegelian. Is it out of keeping with Deleuze’s well-known criticisms of Hegel 
in Difference and Repetition?72 There appears to be an important contrast 
between Deleuze in 1961 (“Lucretius and the Simulacrum”) and in 1968 
(Difference and Repetition). In the latter, far from affirming a true infinity, 
Deleuze argues that a rejection of Kantian extrinsicism requires a rejection of 
the distinction between finite and infinite along with the false question of 
whether infinitesimals are real or fictional.73 The distinction is false because 
the relationship between infinitesimals is a problematic idea, and hence a 
way of letting difference think for itself, and “the entire alternative between 
finite and infinite applies very badly to difference.”74 In Difference and Repetition, 
“infinite” and “finite” merely describe an oscillation internal to 
representation, the systole and diastole of its variable comprehension: 
“infinite and finite are indeed characteristics of a representation in so far as 
the concept that it implicates develops all its possible comprehension or, on 
the contrary, blocks it.”75 Here infinity inevitably means infinite 
representation tied to a conception of possibility as the exceedingly great 
extent to which a concept’s form of identity can be stretched.76 In “Lucretius 
and the Simulacrum”, on the other hand, Deleuze recognizes two infinities – 
one associated (as I have argued) with the infinity of representation and the 
extrinsicism of the Kantian Idea, and the other associated with the nature of 
the problematic idea in its intrinsic development. Despite the consistency of 
Deleuze’s oeuvre, he vacillates on the topic of infinity. In Difference and 
Repetition it sounds like infinity as such cannot escape from representation. 
That book is silent about the other kind of infinity, associated with the self-
determination of problematic ideas, and the speed of the synthetic activity of 
the atomic swerve that relates infinitesimals. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Epicurean Formalization of 
Problematics 
Given the underlying parallels between Difference and Repetition and 
“Lucretius and the Simulacrum”, and despite the discrepancy on the topic of 
infinity, we should expect Deleuze to distinguish between good and bad 
infinities on his own behalf and to advocate the former. This is precisely 
what he and Guattari do in What is Philosophy? (1991), a book that makes 
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Deleuze’s debt to Epicurus even clearer. What is Philosophy? presupposes a 
relationship between thought and infinity. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: 
“Thought demands ‘only’ movement that can be carried to infinity. What 
thought claims by right, what it selects, is infinite movement or movement 
of the infinite. It is this that constitutes the image of thought.”77 Such an 
image of thought is distinct from the dogmatic image Deleuze criticizes in 
Difference and Repetition, which is theorematic, extrinsicist and often inspired 
by negativity. What is Philosophy? contains the formalization of an alternative 
image of thought, which conceives of ideas as problematic and intrinsically 
self-determining. And, to the extent that thought is related to infinity in 
terms of speed, Deleuze and Guattari’s new image of thought has an 
explicitly Epicurean inspiration: “From Epicurus to Spinoza … the problem 
of thought is infinite speed.”78 While Spinoza is discussed elsewhere a 
number of times in What is Philosophy?, Epicurus is not. The derivation of the 
book’s theses from Epicurus remains implicit. Here I shall make it explicit. 
The notion of infinite speed is basically the crux of What is Philosophy? 
Deleuze and Guattari identify infinite speed, in turn, with chaos: “Chaos is 
defined not so much by its disorder as by its infinite speed with which every 
form taking shape in it vanishes.”79 Deleuze and Guattari continue, in terms 
that recall Difference and Repetition, Logic of Sense and the Epicurean theory of 
generation and destruction: “[chaos] is a void that is not a nothingness but a 
virtual … without consistency or reference … Chaos is the infinite speed of 
birth and disappearance.”80  
Crucially, the infinity that Deleuze and Guattari accept and affirm in 
What is Philosophy? is a virtual infinity. What does this mean? Virtual infinity 
is the figure through which Difference and Repetition and “Lucretius and the 
Simulacrum” are reconciled. In Difference and Repetition, virtuality refers to 
the internal differentiation of the problematic idea, effected by intrinsic or 
immanent mechanisms, which is opposed to the interpretation of ideas in 
terms of possibilities (e.g. as impossibilities, something Deleuze considers to 
be implicit in Kant).81 Deleuze thinks that the difference between possible 
and actual states or objects is not a strong enough modal difference to 
ground a philosophy of difference in itself. Aristotle’s terms “possible” and 
“actual” describe modes of one identical concept (some one thing), to which 
an existential quantifier is applied in the case of the actual and denied in the 
case of the possible.82 Deleuze wonders, “What difference can there be 
between the existent and the non-existent if the non-existent is already 
possible, already included in the concept … Existence is the same as but 
outside the concept.” If one begins with this style of thinking about 
possibility, it turns out that “difference can no longer be anything but the 
negative determined by the concept.”83 The determination of difference as 
negative is the great drawback of the discourse on possibility. The virtual 
state of the elements of problematic ideas is not similar, Deleuze says, to a 
supposed possible state. Fundamentally, this is because virtualities are not 
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‘unreal’ (in the sense of lacking actual existence): “The virtual is opposed not 
to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual. … [It 
is] ‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract’.”84 The difference 
between virtuality and actuality (between problematic idea and real 
experience), as opposed to the discourse on possibility, is adequate to theory 
difference in itself. Virtual and actual are different in kind, but such a 
difference in kind is not connected to the presence or absence of reality or 
existence: “it is difficult to understand what existence adds to the concept 
when all it does is double like with like. Such is the deficit of the possible.”85 
The same sense of virtuality is obviously intended in What is Philosophy?, 
where the philosophical concept is said to be “real without being actual, 
ideal without being abstract.”86 
Just as infinity is affirmed in What is Philosophy? (as the infinite speed of 
the virtual), in contrast with Difference and Repetition, the term “concept” has 
also changed its sense. Deleuze and Guattari memorably define philosophy 
as the creation of concepts, but such concepts are not understood, as they are 
in Difference and Repetition, as applications, with greater or lesser extension, 
of a given form of identity.87 This is the case in the earlier book seemingly 
because it treats concepts solely as Aristotelian universals or as Kantian 
categorial concepts of the understanding.88 In contrast, in What is Philosophy? 
concepts are the proper subset of problematic ideas endemic to philosophy. 
Concepts are specifically “philosophical Ideas”, one of at least three kinds of 
“creative ideas”, the other two belonging to science and art.89 To put it 
another way, concepts are the philosophical manner in which problematic 
ideas are meant to determine themselves intrinsically. Deleuze and Guattari 
describe concepts in a variety of suggestive ways: a real concept is an 
“incorporeal” that does not refer to a state of affairs but “speaks the event, 
not the essence of the thing.”90 The concept of a bird, for instance, does not 
refer to the specific or generic essence (e.g. “blue jay” or “corvidae”), but the 
“composition of its postures, colors, and songs: something indiscernable that 
is not so much synesthetic as syneidetic.”91  
This conception of concepts is quite far from the extension of a 
preexistent identity or essence. Deleuze and Guattari do say, however, that a 
concept is the “condensation” or gathering together of heterogeneous 
elements (postures, colors, etc.). The Deleuzoguattarian concept is defined as 
“the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a 
point of absolute survey at infinite speed.” And “survey”, they explain, means 
the “specific infinity” of the concept’s state.92 What should we make of the 
totalizing operation of creating a concept, on the one hand, and the reference 
to infinity, on the other? According to Deleuze and Guattari, concepts gather 
variations like this on account of the specific relation of philosophy to chaos 
(i.e. virtual infinity or infinite speed): “philosophy wants to know how to 
retain infinite speeds while gaining consistency, by giving the virtual a 
consistency specific to it.”93 In other words, philosophy wants to emulate 
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virtual infinity but in a less “dissipative” manner,94 preserving the diverse 
elements that would otherwise vanish. It does so, in part, by creating 
concepts that gather together heterogeneous variations (e.g. of colors, 
postures, etc.) into a whole (still “fragmentary” because it is not a finished 
totality that coheres through a form of identity), which is in turn identified 
with the “specific infinity” of the concept (e.g. blue jay). Deleuze and 
Guattari adopt Epicurean language to say that philosophy “selects infinite 
movements of thought and is filled with concepts formed like consistent 
particles going as fast as thought.”95 
But creating concepts is not all that philosophy does. If it were, then 
philosophy would remain open to the criticism that it merely approximates 
virtual infinity in an extrinsic manner, by asymptotally comparing an 
extremely fast but finite conceptual speed with the truly infinite speed of 
chaos. By retaining the Epicurean terminology and saying that the 
conceptual approximation of virtual infinity moves “as fast as thought”, 
Deleuze and Guattari imply that virtual infinity itself moves faster than 
thought, at “swerve-speed” rather than “atomic speed”, so to speak. In both 
calculus and Epicureanism, Deleuze thinks, an account of the problematic as 
undetermined is supplemented by its self-determination. Both dy/dx and the 
clinamen are specific incarnations of, or ways of thinking about, a primordial 
mechanism of relation or relatedness that precedes the diversity of relata.  
So what do Deleuze and Guattari mean by speed? Speed should be 
understood as the speed of becoming. Since in The Logic of Sense Deleuze 
explicitly identifies events with Platonic “becomings”,96 the fact that a 
concept “speaks the Event” by emulating infinite speed suggests that 
becoming occurs at infinite speed. Commentators sometimes attempt to 
describe Deleuze’s (or Deleuze and Guattari’s) philosophy as promoting the 
priority of “relation” over the terms or self-identical things related.97 That is 
to say, roughly, a “thing” is just a local, relatively stable system of relations, 
and not the embodiment of an essence whose identity belongs to it as a first 
principle. Rather, a thing has had to become identical, to become what it is, 
and is thus subject to a becoming, which is “prior” to its identity. In the old 
philosophical contrast between being and becoming, being always means 
the being of some one thing.98 Rather than “relation”, Deleuze and Guattari 
talk about “speed.” The virtue of this approach lies in the fact that while the 
speed of a being is necessarily finite the speed of becoming is not. Becoming 
must only be said to occur at a calculable, finite rate if it is assumed that 
becoming is something that happens to beings already given, in terms of 
which becoming is measured. But Deleuze’s difference is not the difference 
between two things, but the difference that produces things, whose self-
identity is just a relative not an absolute determination.  
Deleuze and Guattari describe the primacy of pure becoming as 
“infinite speed” because although becoming means a movement, it is not the 
movement of some thing (in the sense of some one thing). Deleuze and 
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Guattari’s “infinite speed” does not mean an actual being accelerated to an 
unlimited velocity (something inconceivable). To call the speed of becoming 
infinite is to submit to a paradoxical expression, to the extent that the speed 
of becoming is incalculable in terms of a finite framework. It is called 
infinite, because it has no finite speed. If “speed” means calculable speed, 
then becoming has no speed; if “speed” does not mean calculable (finite) 
speed, then the speed of becoming is infinite. As we shall see, Deleuze and 
Guattari contrast infinite speed with the very fast but finite speed involved 
in calculating the actual speeds of self-identical things (which they call 
“actualities”). 
To put it otherwise, Deleuze and Guattari's “infinite speed” means 
faster than the minimum time conceivable (a time minimum), and a fortiori 
faster than the fastest physical movement. In Epicurean terms, infinite speed 
means “faster than atomic speed.” Concretely, this entails that movement at 
infinite speed has always already occurred whenever we isolate what we 
believe to be a conceptual or physical minimum. The identifiable minimal 
things (possessing unity, identity, etc.) that we are able to isolate have 
always become identifiable, in the extreme, at an infinite speed. And Deleuze 
and Guattari credit Epicurus, and the notion of swerve, with discovering 
this kind of speed (so long as we understand the swerve not to mean just a 
relation between already self-identical atoms, but the fact that the motion of 
atoms is always tending to change, to become different, before it can be 
determined, assigned a calculable speed or direction). Finally, Deleuze and 
Guattari call infinite speed virtual because they want to claim it is something 
real, but not something that should be understand in terms of an external 
framework (which would be actual). Becoming-different occurs at a virtual, 
infinite speed because (like the swerve) it describes the way that apparently 
unified and self-identical things are only determined as unified and self-
identical according to external criteria, but genuinely possess the internal 
power of determining themselves, which describing them in terms of their 
actual existence and self-identity obscures or ignores. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy’s creation of concepts is always 
accompanied by the correlative constitution of what they call a “plane of 
immanence”, a “secant plane” of virtual infinity, or a section of chaos.99 The 
best way to understand the plane of immanence is as a way of making 
explicit what remained all-too-implicit in the discussion of problematic ideas 
in Difference and Repetition, that it is crucial for problematic Ideas to be 
allowed to determine themselves immanently, that is, in an intrinsic way, 
rather than being determined by some external agency or evaluated 
according to external requirements. What Deleuze calls “representation” 
means the pervasive application of extrinsic requirements to the problem, 
and it returns in What is Philosophy?:  
Philosophers have not been sufficiently concerned with 
the nature of the concept as philosophical reality. They 
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have preferred to think of it as a given knowledge or 
representation that can be explained by the faculties able 
to form it (abstraction or generalization) or employ it 
(judgment).100  
The creation of concepts, in contrast, is not the function of a faculty or 
indeed any unilateral action of thought on something outside it. Rather, the 
creation of concepts depends on their “self-positing” or “autopoetic 
characteristic.” The requirement that concepts have this characteristic is 
equivalent to the requirement that theories of problematic ideas shift from 
being extrinsicisms to intrinsicisms, and it is formalized in the figure of the 
plane of immanence: “there is philosophy wherever there is immanence.”101 
The Epicurean plane of immanence carries movement to an infinite 
speed—faster than the fastest thinkable speed (which would be the 
discontinuous traversal of one minimum of magnitude in one minimum of 
time) to a speed “faster than thought.” While the speed of a concept is the 
speed of thought, this remains nevertheless a specific infinity, an 
approximation of an even faster speed, associated with the autopoetic self-
positing of problems, and described in Epicureanism in terms of a 
mechanism of relation or synthesis anterior to relata (which is Deleuze’s 
interpretation of the clinamen). Deleuze suggests that such a vision of 
philosophy inaugurates a new theory of relations or image of thought, the 
alternative to the dogmatic image that Deleuze sought to articulate 
throughout his career. There is no doubt that this image of thought has a 
profoundly Epicurean inspiration. The entirety of What is Philosophy? is 
devoted to the formalization of such an alternative. The formalization starts 
with the notion of virtual infinity (or chaos), which is sectioned by three 
different planes (corresponding to philosophy, science and art, respectively). 
The philosophical plane-section is a plane of immanence that attempts to 
render consistent the virtuality of the infinite, which means doing justice to 
the tendency of problems to determine themselves in novel ways.  
The chaotic image of thought in What is Philosophy? has a profoundly 
Epicurean inspiration, but not an exclusively Epicurean one. To the extent 
that the discussion of speed resonates with Deleuze’s conception of virtual 
multiplicities, it is inspired by a reading of Henri Bergson and Bernhard 
Riemann. A comparative reading of the concept of speed as it is at work 
throughout Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus also reveals 
contributing intertexts, for example, the ethnographical works on nomadic 
cultures that Deleuze and Guattari use to motivate their “Nomadology”, and 
Paul Virilio’s political thesis in Speed and Politics that the political state is a 
filter or regulator of speeds associated with the rebellious masses, among 
others.102 In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari also remark that the 
problem of infinite speed engages the philosophy not just of Epicurus but of 
Spinoza. Epicurean physics is one source among many for the 
“dromological” (to borrow a term from Virilio) metaphilosophy developed 
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in What is Philosophy? Nevertheless, the specific form that the discussion of 
speed takes (in terms of infinity and chaos) is best understood in light of the 
references to Epicurus.  
Conclusion: Infinite Speed is Not Very Fast Finite Speed 
The discussion of infinite speed in What is Philosophy? has at least one 
direct application. While Deleuze and Guattari’s meta-philosophical 
conception of philosophy is clearly Epicurean in inspiration, their 
conception of the relation between philosophy and science is equally clearly 
inspired by the Stoics. For Deleuze and Guattari, the correct way to explain 
the disciplinary and methodological differences between science and 
philosophy is in terms of the Stoic distinction “between, on the one hand, 
states of affairs or mixtures of bodies in which the event is actualized and, 
on the other, incorporeal events.”103 While they define philosophy as the 
creation of concepts and of a correlative plane of immanence, science is the 
creation of “functions” and of a “plane of reference.”104 The big difference 
between science and philosophy, in their view, is that scientific functions 
express states of affairs in the revitalized Stoic sense. Such states of affairs 
are “actualities, even though they may not yet be bodies or even things, 
units or sets.”105 Philosophy, as we saw, is not concerned primarily with 
actualities but with virtual events: “It is a concept that apprehends the event, 
its becoming, its inseparable variations; whereas a function grasps a state of 
affairs.”106 The contrast between actual and virtual returns in the neo-Stoic 
distinction between science and philosophy. If virtual, as I have said, refers 
to the internal differentiation of the problematic idea, which Deleuze has 
explained as something effected by immanent mechanisms of relation that 
are “infinitely fast” (that is, accomplished before any given thought can 
occur or entity exist), then what is actual? Deleuze and Guattari claim that 
actuality refers to the field of reference created by the sectioning of chaos 
characteristic of science. While philosophy creates concepts in order to 
emulate virtual infinity by means of the specific infinity of the concept and 
the “consistent virtuality” of the plane of immanence, science is 
characterized by a different approach. It doesn’t bother trying to retain 
virtual infinity, but to accomplish something by relinquishing it: science 
“relinquishes the infinite, infinite speed, in order to gain a reference able to 
actualize the virtual.” It accomplishes this specifically by slowing down 
infinite speed. Science is concerned not with the infinite speed of the virtual 
but the very fast speed of the actual. “To slow down,, Deleuze and Guattari 
say, means “to set a limit in chaos to which all speeds are subject”; that is to 
say, installing a limit that acts as a parameter, or extrinsic metric, to which 
actualities are related (what Deleuze and Guattari call a “plane of 
reference”).107 In contrast, the “infinite” speed of virtual infinity has the 
sense of a becoming that is faster than any such limit. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
point in talking about infinite speed is that whenever a very quick but finite 
speed is installed as a limit and a specific field of (scientific) understanding 
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emerges, any claims to understand becoming or difference from the point of 
view of this scientific field (in terms of actualities) is undermined by the fact 
that an “infinitely fast” becoming-different will already have occurred. It’s 
no use, moreover, thinking that this sort of becoming doesn’t occur, or can 
just be ignored. It ought, rather, to be understood as the necessary condition 
of actually diverse things as something real but not actual (in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s terms “virtual”). Deleuze and Guattari’s name for the moving or 
changing elements that are involved in the “infinitely fast” becoming, which 
is primary and seems from the point of view of actuality always to have 
already occurred, is event.     
 Take the concept of atomism. It can be construed in both actual and 
virtual terms. Epicurus’ theory that the eidôla of which thought is made 
travel at some incredibly fast speed “atomic speed” can be seen (as I have 
argued) as a problematic idea in Deleuze’s sense in relation to the clinamen 
whose velocity exceeds the speed of atoms. If this is so, then the swerve is 
the Epicurean figure of what Deleuze and Guattari call “virtual infinity.” 
And insofar as this operator of pure relation or pure becoming, prior to the 
actuality or self-identity of elements, belongs to Epicureanism then the 
Epicurean concept “speaks the event,” that is, it gives us a way of thinking 
about the nature of becoming and difference—since what is becoming but 
becoming-different?—in terms of infinite speed. Alternatively, in actualist 
terms, atoms moving at “atomic speed” may be seen as a quintessentially 
scientific slowing-down of infinite speed, the application of a speed-limit as 
a parameter for evaluating actualities. The fact that Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to the speed of light as one typically scientific figure by which speed is 
limited in the constitution of a plane of reference, combined with the fact 
that Lucretius compares the speed of simulacra to the speed of light, may be 
thought to support the second alternative.108 
 The scientific or actualist construal of Epicureanism, although not the 
final word, is not adventitious. In fact, it points toward Deleuze’s main 
criticism of Epicurean atomism. The concept of atoms, despite Epicurus’ best 
efforts to communicate the immanent auto-determination of the idea 
implied by the swerve, is all too easily construed as involving the 
constitution of a plane of reference. That is, the concept of atomism might 
not be a concept, strictly speaking, but a function referring to states of 
affairs. Deleuze says: “the Epicurean atom still retains too much 
independence, a shape and an actuality. Reciprocal determination [implied 
by the clinamen] here still has too much of the aspect of a spatio-temporal 
relation.”109 Compare the criticisms of Epicurus in Logic of Sense: unlike the 
Stoics, the Epicureans fail to distinguish between bodies and events. Because 
the Epicureans use the swerve to “cleave” the causal relation in a 
dramatically un-Stoic way, the swerve looks like a figure of spatio-temporal 
or negative indeterminacy.110 In turn, this leads to interpretations of the 
swerve in terms of free-will or non-reductive physicalist psychology, 
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approaches that Deleuze would consider to be on the wrong foot. 
 When Deleuze and Guattari talk about infinite speed and chaos in 
What is Philosophy? there are Hellenistic philosophical figures and references 
in play. The purpose of this paper has been to explain Deleuze and 
Guattari’s references to Epicurus and to show what the Epicurean concepts 
are doing in their work. To be clear, I don’t think Deleuze and Guattari are 
thinking here exclusively about ancient philosophy, but they are interested 
enough in the Stoics and Epicureans for an analysis of their ancient 
conceptual touchstones to illuminate, for example, what Deleuze and 
Guattari mean by “infinite speed.” Scholars have become sensitive recently 
to the influence on Stoicism on Deleuze’s thought. The influence of 
Epicureanism is equally evident, but it has not been elucidated entirely. I 
hope this essay goes some way towards doing so.  
The alternative image of thought that What is Philosophy? is 
designed to formalize has both an Epicurean and a Stoic inspiration. It is 
Epicurean in that it starts with infinite speed, which accomplishes 
conjunctive syntheses or relates variations, and is subsequently emulated by 
a plane of immanence called “nature”, a totality without unity whose 
elements are related to one another or determined in a purely intrinsic way. 
The new image of thought is also Stoic, in that it presupposes a difference in 
kind between states of affairs (actualities, including bodies) and events 
(virtualities) derived from the Stoic ontological stemma. But Deleuze thinks 
that the Epicureans, unlike the Stoics, lack a strong distinction between 
events and states of affairs, so that the Epicurean figure of the immanent 
determination of problems (the swerve) is liable to be taken as a 
spontaneous physical motive force. The vast majority of the subsequent 
history of the reception of Epicureanism testifies to this liability. And it may 
be the reason why in the context of the reception of Deleuze, his important 
reading of Epicurus has been overshadowed by attention paid to the Stoics, 
who, despite defending a solid distinction between bodies and events, lack a 
theory of the immanent determination of problems; they lack a spectrum 
like speed by which to compare the consistent thinkable virtuality of events 
with the real chaos of their becoming.  
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